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INTRODUCTION  
Electronic participation (e-participation) has the potential to facilitate citizens’ involvement in 
public affairs, whether through information provision, expanded consultation or in-depth 
deliberative decision-making processes. An early definition of e-participation describes it as 
“ICT-supported participation in processes involved in government and governance” (OECD, 
2003). Saebø et al. (2008, p.402) define e-participation to include all forms of “technology-
mediated interaction between the civil society sphere and the formal political sphere and between 
civil society sphere and the administration sphere”. Highlighting the massive growth in academic 
research and governmental practice of e-participation, Wirtz, Daiser, & Binkowska (2018, p. 3) 
define it as “a participatory process that is enabled by modern information and communication 
technologies” and involves “stakeholders in the public decision-making processes through active 
information exchange, and thus fosters fair and representative policy-making”. 
Often portrayed as a field lacking consistency, e-participation has become increasingly popular 
over the past few years (Medaglia, 2012). In fact, with globalization and technological 
innovations, participatory processes are being challenged and the evolving technology requires 
stakeholders to continuously ‘chase the digital wave’ (Gibson, Römmele, & Williamson, 2014) 
and to foster ways of promoting ‘creative citizenship’ (Rodríguez Bolívar, 2018). The 
participation literature highlights individual resources and the role of institutional and political 
factors as determinants of participation (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995). More recently, 
revisited versions of this theory encompass the role of digital technologies and the positive 
correlation between individual resources and the likelihood of online engagement (Anduiza, 
Gallego, & Cantijoch, 2010). More generally, the academic literature in the field reports positive 
effects of e-participation for democracy, inclusion, transparency, accountability and good 
governance (Bertot, Jaeger, & Grimes, 2012; Medaglia, 2012; Noveck, 2009; Wirtz et al., 2018). 
Following the United Nations E-Government Survey, it is possible to identify three dimensions 
of e-participation, namely e-information, e-consultation and e-decision-making (United Nations, 
2018). E-information reflects government uses of digital technology to provide information to 
citizens. Information made available through Information and Communication Technologies 
(ICTs) can then be used as evidence for the advancement of the next stages in e-participation: 
consultation and decision-making. Public policies and the provision of services can incorporate 
the suggestions and commentaries of citizens directly or indirectly affected. When government 
elicits citizen participation in the formation of public policies and service delivery choices using 
ICTs, the process is defined as e-consultation. Once the consultation period is over, public 
officials “analyze the comments received and publish overall findings” (Scott, 2006, p. 350). The 
third stage of e-participation involves citizen participation in decision-making employing ICTs, 
including e-voting, online deliberation systems, and the evaluation of public policy proposals 
using social media (United Nations, 2018).   
Early research on the determinants of the progress of e-government and e-participation in 
countries around the world highlights the role of technical infrastructure, economic development, 
and education levels as prime explanations (Åström, Karlsson, Linde, & Pirannejad, 2012; Siau 
& Long, 2009). However, prior empirical analyses have largely failed to take into account the 
institutional framework under which these progresses have been accomplished (Gulati, Williams, 
& Yates, 2014). More importantly, these analyses have neglected the fact that political institutions 
are not only affecting the expansion of digital government, but also often interact with more 
structural conditions to constrain or incentivize the adoption and expansion of e-participation 
(Gulati, Williams, & Yates, 2014; Kneuer & Harnisch, 2016).  
This work contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it investigates how institutional 
differences – autocracies vs. democracies, public trust in elected officials, absence of corruption, 
freedom of the press, and government effectiveness – account for the variation in e-participation 
scores across countries and over time. This builds on and extends prior work by Bussell (2011) 
and Kneuer & Harnisch (2016) assessing the differences in the expansion of e-government in 
democracies and autocracies. Second, this aggregate analysis allows the examination of not only 
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the direct effects of institutional variation on e-participation, but also the interactions between 
institutional conditions and other factors affecting the development of e-participation across 
countries. Third, by focusing the analysis on the political and institutional determinants of e-
participation at the country level, this chapter fills in an important lacuna in prior empirical 
studies, which have focused primarily on socioeconomic resources and internet skills as 
individual drivers of e-participation (Khoirunnida, Hidayanto, Purwandari, Kartika, & Kosandi, 
2017; Vicente & Novo, 2014). Lastly, our contribution is also methodological. The analyses 
employ fractional regression models (Papke & Wooldridge, 1996) as the main empirical method 
to avoid the pitfalls entailed in using ordinary least square regression on a censored dependent 
variable like the UN E-Participation Index.  
In particular, this research analyses the effects of institutional factors in encouraging or 
constraining e-participation across countries over a period of ten years (2008-2018) through a 
quantitative approach. The dependent variable of the analysis is a proxy for e-participation 
readiness, the UNDESA’s E-Participation Index (EPI). This index evaluates 193 countries every 
two years, based on three main dimensions: provision of information by governments to citizens 
(e-information), interaction with stakeholders (e-consultation), and engagement in decision-
making processes (e-decision making). The key explanatory variables of this research are the 
institutional and political factors affecting e-participation.  
After the introduction, the theoretical model is presented, and the hypotheses supported by the 
literature on e-participation are discussed. The following section introduces the data and methods 
employed in this research and then the empirical analyses are presented. The next part of this 
chapter is devoted to a discussion of the findings. Lastly, the authors focus on a set of conclusions 




This chapter builds on prior studies of factors affecting e-government development and proposes 
a theoretical model to examine how the performance of political institutions impacts the adoption 
and implementation of e-participation in a comparative perspective. The model highlights not 
only the direct effects of political institutions, but also how their performance interacts with 
technology penetration and socio-economic development to account for specific levels of e-
participation both across space and over time. Concretely, the model posits that both variables 
mediate the positive effects of the quality of political institutions on e-participation.  
Early work in the field of Information Systems has identified a series of factors that impact e-
government development in countries around the world. Several studies have shown that 
technology penetration and human development levels are positively associated with a country’s 
e-government development (Siau & Long, 2009), performance (Stier, 2015), and maturity 
(Ifinedo, 2012; Ifinedo & Singh, 2011; Larosiliere & Carter, 2016; Singh, Das, & Joseph, 2007). 
These efforts have proven useful for the theoretical developments attempting to explain the 
expansion of e-participation. One of the most comprehensive pieces of research by Krishnan et 
al. (2017) combines the analysis of the determinants of e-government maturity and e-participation 
in a single article and confirms the positive association of both ICT infrastructure and human 
capital development with the expansion of digital government. If a country’s human and socio-
economic development is an indicator of a stronger civil society and more active grassroots 
movements, it is also likely that these countries will display higher commitment to e-participation 
(Reddick and Norris, 2013). 
Early work by Milner (2006, p. 178) suggests that “political institutions in particular matter for 
the adoption of new technologies because they affect the manner and degree to which winners 
and losers from the technology can translate their preferences into influence”. Democracies are 
also more likely to experience citizen pressure and transparency norms capable of stimulating the 
use of e-participation tools (Kneuer & Harnisch, 2016). In a similar vein, Stier (2015) suggests 
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that liberal democracies with competitive elections are more likely to be concerned with citizen-
centric deliberation and therefore promote e-participation. Democratic governments are also more 
likely to encourage multiple forms of political expression and checks on power (Gulati, Williams, 
& Yates, 2014). This willingness to promote transparency will find in e-participation tools the 
obvious means to attain these goals.  
Milner (2006, p. 178) also argues that “the Internet can provide civil society with uncensored 
information, costless sharing of that information, and tools to overcome collective action 
problems for organizing opposition”. Logically, other indicators of the quality of political 
institutions are just as likely to be related to e-participation. Just as e-government in general, e-
participation has also been associated with perceived transparency (Zheng & Schachter, 2017), 
reduced corruption (Bussell, 2011), improved trust in government (Zolotov, Oliveira, & 
Casteleyn, 2018), and enhanced legitimacy of political systems through the involvement of 
citizens in the political and administrative debate (Åström et al., 2012; Stier, 2015).  
All these indicators of the quality of political institutions have been associated with e-
participation, but their interaction with more infrastructural conditions is less understood. In other 
words, the quality of political institutions is likely to have varying effects on e-participation across 
countries with different levels of technology penetration and socio-economic development. 
Authors investigating the determinants of e-participation have failed to explore this possibility, 
since they have only tested the direct (or additive) effects of these variables. However, it is 
reasonable to expect that countries with similar political institutions or comparable democratic 
performance indicators will perform very differently if the penetration of technology or human 
capital levels are substantially different. In fact, high quality political institutions are more likely 
to rely on e-participation tools if their infrastructure and human capital performance is also high. 
Conversely, autocracies with large investments in technological infrastructure and penetration 
may fare better in terms of e-participation than autocracies where this investment has not 
occurred. In theory, both technology penetration and socio-economic development are likely to 
mediate the relationship between the quality of political institutions and the reliance on e-
participation. Figure 1 displays these theoretical relationships. The next part of this chapter 
operationalizes the concepts included in the model and translates the theoretical connections into 
hypotheses.  








The model posits a positive association between higher quality of political institutions and the 
levels of e-participation. Research exploring these effects on e-participation has employed a 
diverse set of indicators to operationalize the quality of political institutions (Stier, 2015), 
including democratic performance, corruption levels, trust in government, government 
effectiveness, and freedom of the press, and obtained mixed findings. This part of the chapter 
reviews this literature and employs it to support the hypotheses to be tested in the empirical 
section. The first part of this section discusses the additive hypotheses linking the quality of 
political institutions and e-participation. In the second part, we present the interactive hypotheses 
arguing that the relationship between political institutions and e-participation is mediated by the 
countries’ structural conditions, namely varying levels of technology penetration and 
socioeconomic development.  
 
Additive hypotheses 
Aggregate analyses of the effects of democratic performance at the country level report interesting 
but somewhat limited findings. Kneuer & Harnisch (2016) found substantive differences in e-
participation levels between democracies and autocracies. Democracies are early adopters of e-
participation and remain above all other regime categories defined by the authors, including 
flawed democracies, multiparty, single party and military regimes. Åström et al. (2012) employ 
ordinary least squares regressions to analyze the effect of a country’s democratic performance on 
e-participation levels over time. They find a positive association between their measure of 
democracy based on the Freedom House and Polity IV Indexes and the 2003 UN E-Participation 
Index. This effect disappears in the remaining years of the analysis (2004, 2005, 2008 and 2010). 
A similar finding is reported by Stier (2015), who finds positive associations between the level of 
democracy and e-government performance for the years of 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2007 and null 
findings after that (2009, 2011, and 2013). This dynamic analysis also shows that autocratic 
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governments may be the ones most interested in improving the interaction with citizens using e-
participation tools. Gulati et al. (2014) use multiple regression analysis to explain e-participation 
capabilities across countries and fail to find the expect positive effect of a democratic political 
structure. A study by Jho & Song (2015) uncovers a positive association between the level of 
democracy and e-participation, but the same authors fail to confirm a similar effect for the level 
of institutionalization of free speech and association. Despite these mixed findings, the hypothesis 
regarding democratic performance reflects the theoretical expectations stated above (Stier, 2015): 
H1a: More consolidated democracies display higher levels of e-participation. 
In contrast with the aggregate analyses mentioned above, individual-level analyses report 
important links between political variables and individual e-participation. Porumbescu (2016) 
employs a sample of 1100 Seoul residents and finds a positive relationship between citizen 
perceptions of public sector trustworthiness and the use of public sector social media accounts. 
Zolotov et al. (2018) conducted a meta-analytical review of e-participation adoption models and 
found that generalized trust, and more specifically, trust in government are significant predictors 
of the likelihood of adoption of e-participation. Novo Vázquez & Rosalía Vicente (2019) analyze 
e-participation in Spanish municipalities and find that political interest, external political efficacy, 
and associational membership are relevant predictors of individual e-participation. We extend 
these tests to the aggregate level by hypothesizing that: 
H1b: Higher levels of trust in politicians have a positive effect on a country’s level of e-
participation 
Bussell (2011) investigated the association between the corruption scores measured by 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index and a country’s e-government quality 
as assessed by the UN E-government Index. The author finds a robust relationship between both 
variables, therefore supporting the idea that corruption levels dampen countries efforts to promote 
“higher quality technology-enabled service reforms” (p.275). Given the limited evidence linking 
corruption levels and e-participation, we might expect a similar relationship: 
H1c: Higher corruption levels have a negative effect on a country’s level of e-participation.  
To our knowledge, no empirical study has yet linked freedom of the press levels with e-
participation. However, early work by Sylvester and McGlynn (2010) analyzed data from the 
2007 Pew Internet and American Life project and found an association between using the 
newspaper for information and the likelihood of contacting government by email. Hollyer, 
Rosendorff and Vreeland (2014) developed the HRV government transparency index and applied 
it to 149 countries from 1980-2008. The authors test the effect of daily newspaper circulation on 
the HRV index using World Bank data and found support for a strong positive effect. While both 
articles are not testing the relationship between freedom of the press and e-participation, they 
provide anecdotal evidence supporting our next hypothesis:  
H1d: Freedom of the press is positively associated with a country’s level of e-participation. 
In contrast with the mixed findings reported for the association between democratic performance 
and e-participation levels, higher government effectiveness is systematically associated with e-
participation (Gulati et al., 2014; Stier, 2015). In fact, Stier’s analyses indicate an increasing 
impact of this explanatory factor over time. Gulati, Williams, & Yates (2014) investigate the 
determinants of e-participation in 158 countries reported by the 2010 UN E-Participation Index. 
The authors find that countries with a more effective public sector governance display higher 
scores of e-participation. This result underscores how the professionalization of public 
administration helps governments to embrace novel online participatory tools. Conversely, it also 
suggests that weak government institutions compromise the best intentions to undertake 
innovative e-participation opportunities. This suggests that: 
H1e: Better government performance (effectiveness) is positively associated with a country’s 
level of e-participation.  
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The diffusion of e-government (and e-participation) can be hindered by restricted access to 
broadband internet bandwidth, mobile network coverage, and technological interoperability 
(Zhang, Xu, & Xiao, 2014). Sound and reliable ICT infrastructure is even more crucial for the 
implementation of e-participation tools, since it facilitates access to information, reduces physical 
and geographical barriers to participation, improves the quality of feedback in public 
consultations, and empowers citizens to engage in deliberative policy-making (DiMaggio, 
Hargittai, Neuman, & Robinson, 2001; Saebø et al., 2008). Several empirical studies have 
investigated the impact of technology infrastructure on e-government development and maturity 
levels (Ifinedo & Singh, 2011; Siau & Long, 2009; Singh et al., 2007; Stier, 2015). Åström et al. 
(2012) investigate the determinants of e-participation in over 100 countries between 2003 and 
2010 and find that internet users per 100 citizens – a proxy for access to technology infrastructure 
– is the strongest predictor of e-participation. Krishnan, Teo & Lymm (2017) employ cross-
sectional data from 183 countries and find a positive effect of ICT infrastructure on both e-
government maturity levels and a government’s willingness to implement e-participation. Given 
the strength of these findings, we predict that: 
H2: The level of technology penetration in a country is positively associated with its e-
participation levels. 
Developed in the field of Economics, human capital theory argues that investments in education, 
training, knowledge and health of the individuals in the labor force lead to economic growth over 
time (Becker, 1964; Schultz, 1961). E-government development has been linked to these 
indicators of socioeconomic development in past empirical works (Siau & Long, 2009; Stier, 
2015). However, prior attempts to test the relationship between socioeconomic development 
levels and e-participation have failed to provide consistent results. The study by Åström et al. 
(2012) finds no association between the Human Development Index (HDI) and the UN’s E-
Participation Index. Jho & Song (2015) find a positive correlation between the same variables for 
the 2010 version of the e-participation index, but their models are severely misspecified, so this 
result is unconvincing. Lastly, Gulati et al. (2014) examine several indicators of 
sociodemographic development (education, urbanization and land area) and find positive 
associations between these indicators and the e-participation index. The overall set of findings 
suggests that socioeconomic development is likely to predict the levels of e-participation, but this 
association seems largely contingent on the indicators employed to measure socioeconomic 
development. Hence, we hypothesize that: 
H3: The level of socioeconomic development in a country is positively associated with its e-
participation level. 
The following paragraphs focus on the moderating effects that technology penetration and socio-




Prior attempts have been developed to explore the interaction between political institutions and 
other factors affecting e-participation levels. Jho & Song (2015) investigate the moderating 
effects between technology and institutions, but their analysis is based on a single point in time 
(data from the 2012 UN E-Participation Index). The authors find that technology reinforces the 
positive effect of political institutions on e-participation. Despite these earlier efforts, none of the 
empirical studies investigated multiple moderating effects between explanatory variables both 
across countries and over time.  
The theoretical model portrayed in Figure 1 argues that technology penetration and the levels of 
human and socio-economic development of countries is likely to enhance the positive effects of 
the quality of political institutions on e-participation levels. In other words, it can be expected 
that better technology penetration and human capital will reinforce the relationship between 
political institutions and e-participation, whereas poor technology penetration and insufficient 
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human capital are unsurmountable obstacles to any attempts at increasing e-participation levels. 
More concretely, we predict that:  
H4: The positive association between the quality of political institutions and e-participation will 
be stronger in countries with better technology penetration. 
And: 
H5: The positive association between the quality of political institutions and e-participation will 
be stronger in countries with better human capital development. 
Figure 2 displays the empirical model of e-participation to be tested in the remaining sections of 
this chapter.  
 
Figure 2. Comprehensive Research Model for Empirical Studies 
 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
The dependent variable of the analysis is the UNDESA’s E-Participation Index (EPI). The index 
is currently a biannual publication that evaluates 193 countries on three main dimensions: 
provision of information by governments to citizens (e-information), interaction with 
stakeholders (e-consultation), and engagement in decision-making processes (e-decision 
making). The collection of the data in which the EPI is based is performed by a group of more 
than 100 researchers, through a survey that evaluates the websites and portals of the central 
government, ministries and other governmental agencies of all UN member states.  
In order to test the hypothesis related with relationship between institutional indicators and e-
participation, the analysis employs five independent variables, assessing different dimensions of 
the political institutions, namely: 
- The Autocracy-Democracy Index of the Polity IV database (autocracy-democracy); 
- The Public Trust in Politicians Index by the World Economic Forum (trust_politicians); 
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- The Control of Corruption Index of the Worldwide Governance Indicators (corruption); 
- The Freedom of the Press Index by Reporters Without Borders (pressfree); 
- The Government Effectiveness Index of the Worldwide Governance Indicators 
(gov_effectiveness). 
As a technology penetration indicator, the number of mobile cellular subscriptions per 100 
inhabitants (mobile_cellular), taken from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank, 
is used. To proxy the socio-economic development, the Human Development Index (HDI), 
compiled every year by the United Nations Development Program is used. Besides the income 
dimension, this index also contemplates life expectancy and education, what makes it a broader 
measure of development than the real GDP per capita (Åström et al., 2012; Stier, 2015). 
As additional control variables, economic and demographic indicators are used, following the 
previous literature on the determinants of e-participation and e-government maturity. The degree 
of economic globalization has been linked to increased investments in e-government, particularly 
among market-oriented autocracies, as suggested by Stier (2015). The rationale is two-fold. On 
one hand, autocracies hope to diffuse political criticism by delivering on the economic 
development front. Significant investments in e-government infrastructure and services are likely 
to accomplish this goal. On the other hand, authoritarian governments’ search for legitimacy, both 
domestically and internationally, may stimulate the relaxation of information restraints through 
limited promotion of e-participation tools (Åström et al., 2012; Egorov, Guriev, & Sonin, 2009; 
King, Pan, & Roberts, 2013; Noesselt, 2014). Consequently, we use the KOF Index of economic 
globalization (eco_global) developed by Dreher, Gaston & Martens (2008) as independent 
variable. Lastly, the analyses also include the size of a country’s population (pop) to capture 
economies of scale entailed by the fixed costs associated with the implementation of e-
government programs (Bussell, 2011; Milner, 2006; Norris & Moon, 2005; Stier, 2015). Table 1 
presents the descriptive statistics for all variables. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for the period 2008-2018 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation 
Observations 
EPI 
Overall 0.340 0.290 N=1145 
Between  0.220 n=191 
Within  0.190  
autocracy-
democracy 
Overall 0.699 0.312 N=1931 
Between  0.305 n=162 
Within  0.069  
trust_politicians 
Overall 0.435 0.171 N=1642 
Between  0.157 n=149 
Within  0.061  
corruption 
Overall 0.513 0.199 N=2265 
Between  0.197 n=189 
Within  0.030  
press_free 
Overall 0.719 0.159 N=2017 
Between  0.144 n=172 
Within  0.067  
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gov_effectiveness 
Overall 0.487 0.197 N=2265 
Between  0.195 n=189 
Within  0.030  
mobile_cellular 
Overall 89.131 42.656 N=2235 
Between  36.525 n=190 
Within  22.537  
HDI 
Overall 0.689 0.156 N=2205 
Between  0.155 n=185 
Within  0.019  
pop (billions) 
Overall 0.037 0.138 N=2274 
Between  0.138 n=190 
Within  0.005  
eco_global 
Overall 0.585 0.155 N=2002 
Between  0.153 n=182 
Within  0.028  
Notes: N – total number of observations for each variable; n – number of observed countries for 
each variable.  
 
As the EPI is a censored variable, defined in a scale where 0 represents the lowest possible score 
and 1 the highest possible score, the analyses employ fractional regression models (Papke & 
Wooldridge, 1996) as the main empirical method. This allows us to overcome a pitfall of previous 
studies that use the least squares estimator (e.g. Åström et al., 2012; Jho & Song, 2015; Stier, 
2015): the possibility of predicting outcome values for the dependent variable that are lower than 
0 or higher than 1, violating the boundaries of the index. As a strategy to avoid multicollinearity 
and given the high correlation amongst some of the institutional variables, the H1 sub-hypotheses 
(H1a to H1e) are tested by estimating different models for each institutional dimension. 
Additionally, as the EPI is coded in the year prior to the index’s release1, as a strategy to prevent 
reverse causality and minimize endogeneity concerns, the independent variables of the models 
are lagged by two periods.Variance inflated factors are calculated at each stage of the analysis to 
control for the possibility of multicollinearity and robust standard errors are also used to avoid 
heteroscedasticity. At last, for purposes of coherency and to facilitate the interpretation of the 
regression coefficients, all the indexes that are originally in a different scale were rescaled to a 0 
to 1 scale. For all the indexes that are used, 0 represents the lowest possible score and 1 the highest 
possible score. Therefore, in each of those indexes the value of 1 is obtained by the countries with 
the most democratic institutions (autocracy-democracy), the highest trust in politicians 
(trust_politicians), the highest corruption levels (corruption), the highest freedom of the press 
(press_free), the highest level of government effectiveness (gov_effectiveness), the highest human 
development (HDI) or the highest level of economic globalization (eco_global). 
Within the empirical framework mentioned above, the procedure can be divided in three main 
steps: first, cross section regressions for the different years to which the EPI is available in the 
sample period are estimated; second, panel regressions are considered; third, the interactive 
hypotheses are tested, using panel data models that consider interaction terms between the 
 
1 The survey questionnaire in which the 2018 index is based, was implemented in 2017. The same 
happens in the remaining years to which the EPI is available. 
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political-institutional variables and either the technology penetration or the human development 
variables. 
A general model that summarizes the first step of the approach is represented by equation (1): 
 EPI ,  = β  + β .Institutional ,  + β .mobile_cellular ,  + β .HDI ,  + 
γ.Control′ ,  + ε           (1) 
 
where EPI ,  represents the EPI index of country i in the year t, Institutional ,  is a two-period 
lagged variable that proxies one of the proxies for the five political institutional dimensions 
considered in the theoretical model. mobile_cellular ,  relates to H2 and stands for the two-
period lagged mobile cellular penetration rate, while HDI ,  relates to H3, standing for the two-
period lagged value of the human development index. Control′ ,  is a vector of two-period 
lagged control variables that contains the remaining economic and demographic variables. 
Finally, ε  stands for the error term, while β , β , β , β  and γ represent the parameters, or vectors 
of parameters, to be estimated.  
In the second step, six observations in time (2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016 and 2018) are used, 
and controls for time effects and country-level fixed effects are added to the model, as represented 
in equation (2). 
 EPI ,  = β  + β .Institutional ,  + β .mobile_cellular ,  + β .HDI ,  + 
γ.Control′ ,  + λ  + μ  + ε         (2) 
 
In this case, λ  represents time effects, defined as a set of year dummy variables, μ  stands for 
country-level fixed effects and everything else remains as in equation (1). To decide whether we 
include fixed effects or not, we rely on Hausman specification tests (Hausman, 1978). The null 
hypothesis of the test is the absence of significant differences between the coefficients of a 
consistent estimator, the fixed effects one, and an alternative efficient estimator, typically the 
random effects one. The rejection of the null indicates that the inclusion of fixed effects is 
needed.2 As, to be best of the authors’ knowledge, there is no standard way of including random 
effects in the fractional probit framework, a model with no fixed nor random effects was used in 
the cases of no rejection of the Hausman test’s null. In such cases, the results obtained via the 
fractional regression and the random effects estimates were compared to make sure that the 
absence of random effects did not substantially affected the results. 
To test the interactive hypothesis, extensions of the model represented in equation (2) are 
estimated. These consider either interactions between the institutional and the technology 
penetration variable (H4), or interactions between the first and human development (H5). To test 
H4, the following extension was considered: 
 EPI , = β  + β .Institutional ,  + β .mobile_cellular ,  + β . Institutional ∗mobile_cellular , + β .HDI ,  + γ.Control′ ,  + λ  + μ  + ε    (3) 
 
2 To implement the test, auxiliary fixed effects and random effects regressions are estimated. A 
correction to base both (co)variance matrices on disturbance variance estimate from the efficient 
estimator is applied whenever the covariance matrix of the test did not reveal to be positive 




where Institutional ∗ mobile_cellular ,  represents the interaction between the institutional 
and the technology penetration-related variable and everything else remains as in equation (2). 
Equation (4) represents the extension that allows to test H5: 
 EPI , = β  + β .Institutional ,  + β .HDI ,  + β . Institutional ∗ HDI , + β .mobile_cellular ,  + γ.Control′ ,  + λ  + μ  + ε      (4) 
 
where Institutional ∗ HDI ,  represents the interaction between the institutional variables and 




Cross Section Results 
 
As explained previously, the analysis starts by contemplating cross sectional models for the 
different years of the sample period. When scattering the values for the EPI and the autocracy-
democracy index, no linear relationship arises3, so the chosen specification of the model considers 
two dummy variables: autocracy-democracy_>p75 is equal to 1 whenever, in a given year, the 
country’s score in the autocracy-democracy index is above the percentile 75 of that year scores’ 
distribution, and 0 otherwise; autocracy-democracy_<p25 is equal to 1 whenever, in a given year, 
the country’s score in the autocracy-democracy index is below the percentile 25 of that year 
scores’ distribution, and 0 otherwise. Table 2 presents the results for the average marginal effects 
of the fractional probit regressions of the models that follow equation (1) and include the variables 
related to democracy (H1a), with each column corresponding to a different year. 
 
Table 2. Average marginal effects of the fractional probit regressions – democracy (H1a) – 
dependent variable: EPI 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables 2018 2016 2014 2012 2010 2008 
              
autocracy-democracy_>p75 0.091** 0.045 0.035 -0.003 0.030 0.002 
 (0.036) (0.035) (0.050) (0.048) (0.035) (0.044) 
autocracy-democracy_<p25 -0.012 0.020 -0.008 0.011 -0.030 -0.041 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.043) (0.030) (0.034) 
mobile_cellular/100 -0.036 -0.037 0.010 0.014 -0.106** 0.039 
 (0.061) (0.054) (0.059) (0.055) (0.052) (0.061) 
HDI 0.974*** 1.189*** 1.091*** 1.112*** 1.031*** 0.622*** 
 (0.141) (0.167) (0.177) (0.206) (0.184) (0.210) 
pop (billions) 0.573** 0.310*** 0.260*** 0.120 0.131*** 0.223*** 
 (0.251) (0.068) (0.067) (0.079) (0.031) (0.054) 
eco_global 0.239* 0.101 0.039 0.010 0.091 0.055 
 
3 The scatter plot may be provided by the authors upon request. Moreover, when using a panel 
model with random effects, one of the dummies reveals to be statistically significant, but the same 
does not happen with the original variable. 
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 (0.137) (0.132) (0.133) (0.148) (0.118) (0.149) 
       
Observations 158 157 157 158 156 156 
Pseudo R2 0.162 0.144 0.126 0.169 0.148 0.108 
Log-likelihood -88.72 -93.12 -93.97 -74.23 -70.24 -72.92 
AIC 191.4 200.2 201.9 162.5 154.5 159.8 
SIC 212.9 221.6 223.3 183.9 175.8 181.2 
Notes: All models were estimated with a constant. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
The results reveal that the more democratic countries are, when compared to countries whose EPI 
is between the sample percentile 25 and 75, associated with higher EPI scores. However, that is 
only true for the last year of the sample. In contrast no significant results were obtained for the 
dummy variable that identifies the most autocratic countries (autocracy-democracy_<p25). 
Regarding the results for the remaining variables, strong support for H3 was found. The HDI’s 
coefficient is positive and significant for all the years. Moreover, the magnitude of the coefficient 
reveals to be stable, except for the year of 2008, where the coefficient drops from a value around 
1 to approximately 0.6. Population also exerts a positive and significant impact on EPI, and only 
for 2012 its coefficient is not significant. In contrast, no support for H2 is found, neither for the 
relationship between the level of economic globalization and e-participation. 
 
The results for the average marginal effects of the fractional probit regressions of the models that 
follow equation (1) and include the variables related to public trust in politicians are presented in 
Table 3. Once again, each column corresponds to a different year. 
Table 3. Average marginal effects of the fractional probit regressions – trust (H1b) – dependent 
variable: EPI 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables 2018 2016 2014 2012 2010 2008 
              
trust_politicians 0.092 0.034 0.076 0.237** 0.078 0.118 
 (0.089) (0.086) (0.115) (0.098) (0.100) (0.083) 
mobille_cellular/100 -0.045 -0.068 -0.061 0.015 -0.125* 0.034 
 (0.058) (0.054) (0.060) (0.061) (0.068) (0.066) 
HDI 1.009*** 1.212*** 1.151*** 1.127*** 1.168*** 0.627*** 
 (0.133) (0.169) (0.168) (0.207) (0.216) (0.232) 
pop (billions) 0.466** 0.294*** 0.244*** 0.092 0.131*** 0.233*** 
 (0.195) (0.064) (0.078) (0.092) (0.042) (0.058) 
eco_global 0.208 0.136 0.020 -0.156 0.064 0.035 
(0.139) (0.155) (0.147) (0.179) (0.167) (0.171) 
       
Observations 136 140 141 136 129 148 
Pseudo R2 0.141 0.122 0.0920 0.128 0.116 0.0944 
Log-likelihood -74.48 -84.65 -88.48 -71.78 -64.68 -72.11 
AIC 161 181.3 189 155.6 141.4 156.2 
SIC 178.4 199 206.6 173 158.5 174.2 
Notes: All models were estimated with a constant. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
The cross-sectional results do not provide a strong support to H1b. In spite of always exhibiting 
positive coefficients, meaning that a higher public trust in politicians is associated with higher e-
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participation levels, the trust_politicians variable is only significant in the year of 2012. For that 
year, it is estimated that on average, an increase of one point in the Public Trust in Politicians 
index is associated with an increase of approximately 0.24 points in the EPI. 
Regarding mobile_cellular and HDI, the variables related with H2 and H3, the scenario is 
consistent with the one described for Table 2. The same applies to the two control variables, pop 
and eco_global. 
Table 4 presents the results for the models where corruption is an independent variable. In this 
case, to make the interpretation of the results more intuitive and consistent with the sign predicted 
in H1c, the scale of the corruption index was inverted, in a way that higher values of the index 
correspond to higher perceived corruption levels.  
As hypothesized, the results point to a negative relationship between corruption and e-
participation levels. The coefficients of the corruption variable are significant for two of the six 
years considered: 2008 and 2018. For those years, it is estimated that, on average, a one-point 
increase in the corruption index is associated with a 0.26 and 0.31 decrease in the EPI. 
 
Table 4.  Average marginal effects of the fractional probit regressions – corruption (H1c) – 
dependent variable: EPI 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables 2018 2016 2014 2012 2010 2008 
              
corruption -0.305*** -0.137 -0.171 -0.110 -0.087 -0.261*** 
(0.111) (0.100) (0.112) (0.103) (0.084) (0.101) 
mobile_cellular/100 0.034 0.019 0.018 0.014 -0.085* 0.021 
 (0.054) (0.048) (0.050) (0.050) (0.047) (0.056) 
HDI 0.827*** 1.057*** 0.934*** 0.959*** 0.898*** 0.352* 
 (0.155) (0.169) (0.173) (0.203) (0.173) (0.187) 
pop (billions) 0.685** 0.383*** 0.313*** 0.156* 0.163*** 0.246*** 
 (0.344) (0.093) (0.086) (0.083) (0.041) (0.063) 
eco_global 0.097 0.029 0.010 -0.021 0.115 0.075 
 (0.137) (0.130) (0.136) (0.143) (0.120) (0.140) 
       
Observations 180 179 179 180 180 179 
Pseudo R2 0.143 0.125 0.109 0.155 0.135 0.107 
Log-likelihood -104.6 -108.5 -108 -82.80 -77.98 -80.19 
AIC 221.1 229 228 177.6 168 172.4 
SIC 240.3 248.1 247.1 196.8 187.1 191.5 
Notes: All models were estimated with a constant. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
All the remaining variables in the model follow the pattern of the previous tables: no support for 
the importance of technology penetration and economic globalization and strong support for the 







Table 5. Average marginal effects of the fractional probit regressions – freedom of the press 
(H1d) – dependent variable: EPI 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables 2018 2016 2014 2012 2010 2008 
              
pressfree 0.255 0.097 0.040 -0.048 0.095 0.175 
 (0.161) (0.165) (0.076) (0.110) (0.094) (0.112) 
mobile_cellular/100 -0.012 -0.019 0.013 0.017 -0.112** 0.013 
 (0.057) (0.052) (0.054) (0.053) (0.052) (0.064) 
HDI 0.980*** 1.186*** 1.097*** 1.096*** 1.024*** 0.642*** 
 (0.132) (0.150) (0.153) (0.174) (0.173) (0.206) 
pop (billions) 0.662** 0.348*** 0.285*** 0.126 0.153*** 0.250*** 
 (0.302) (0.076) (0.075) (0.084) (0.038) (0.066) 
eco_global 0.237* 0.104 0.021 0.011 0.123 0.021 
 (0.137) (0.127) (0.132) (0.147) (0.123) (0.160) 
       
Observations 166 164 164 165 161 156 
Pseudo R2 0.149 0.136 0.114 0.159 0.138 0.102 
Log-likelihood -94.82 -98.25 -99.21 -77.85 -72.40 -72.90 
AIC 201.6 208.5 210.4 167.7 156.8 157.8 
SIC 220.3 227.1 229 186.3 175.3 176.1 
Notes: All models were estimated with a constant. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
As in the corruption index case, the scale of the Freedom of the Press index was inverted to make 
the interpretation of the coefficients easier and consistent with the hypotheses presented earlier in 
this chapter. Therefore, higher values of the index correspond to higher freedom of the press and 
positive coefficients associated with pressfree mean that more freedom of the press is associated 
with higher e-participation levels. Table 5 presents the results for the average marginal effects of 
the fractional probit regressions of the models that include the variable related to press freedom 
(H1d). 
The results reveal that, although mostly positive as hypothesized, the coefficients of the pressfree 
variable are never significant. Therefore, H1d is not supported. Regarding the remaining four 
independent variables of the model, nothing substantially new arises when comparing the results 
of Table 5 with the ones reported in Tables 2 to 4. 
Lastly, Table 6 presents the results for the average marginal effects of the fractional probit 
regressions of the models that include the variable related to government effectiveness (H1e). As 
in the remaining tables of this section, each column corresponds to a different year. 
 
Table 6. Average marginal effects of the fractional probit regressions – government 
effectiveness (H1e) – dependent variable: EPI 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables 2018 2016 2014 2012 2010 2008 
              
gov_effectiveness 0.696*** 0.587*** 0.360*** 0.325** 0.279*** 0.396*** 
 (0.142) (0.130) (0.136) (0.133) (0.095) (0.124) 
mobile_cellular/100 0.035 0.032 0.016 0.018 -0.093** 0.008 
 (0.049) (0.043) (0.047) (0.049) (0.046) (0.056) 
HDI 0.473*** 0.660*** 0.787*** 0.759*** 0.753*** 0.260 
 (0.166) (0.178) (0.174) (0.199) (0.157) (0.177) 
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pop (billions) 0.545** 0.316*** 0.281*** 0.122 0.130*** 0.209*** 
 (0.270) (0.077) (0.081) (0.078) (0.040) (0.059) 
eco_global -0.021 -0.136 -0.076 -0.113 0.036 0.022 
 (0.133) (0.126) (0.141) (0.153) (0.122) (0.145) 
       
Observations 180 179 179 180 180 179 
Pseudo R2 0.153 0.134 0.112 0.161 0.141 0.110 
Log-likelihood -103.3 -107.4 -107.6 -82.25 -77.48 -79.86 
AIC 218.6 226.7 227.3 176.5 167 171.7 
SIC 237.8 245.9 246.4 195.6 186.1 190.9 
Notes: All models were estimated with a constant. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
The hypothesis that higher government effectiveness is associated with higher e-participation 
levels (H1e) is strongly supported by the results. The coefficients associated with 
gov_effectiveness are positive and significant for all the years under studied. It is also worth 
mentioning that the magnitude of the coefficients exhibits a positive trend over time. From 2008 
to 2014, it is estimated that, on average, a one-point increase in the government effectiveness 
index, is associated with an increase of 0.28 to 0.4 points in the EPI. However, in the most recent 
years, 2016 and 2018, the estimated coefficients are respectively around 0.59 and 0.7. 
Once again, the results for the remaining independent variables are similar to the ones reported 




The second step of the empirical analysis considers panel regressions, with six observations in 
time (2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016 and 2018). Time effects and, in some cases, fixed effects, 
were added, as described by equation (2) above. As high variance inflated factors were found for 
the eco_global variable and it was almost never statistically significant in the cross-sectional 
regressions, it is excluded here. Table 7 contains the results for the average marginal effects of 
the fractional probit regressions. Column (1) includes the democracy-related dummy variables, 
column (2) the public trust in politicians index, column (3) the corruption index, column (4) the 
freedom of the press index and column (5) the government effectiveness one. 
Table 7. Average marginal effects of the panel fractional probit regressions– dependent 
variable: EPI 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables democracy trust corruption press freedom gov_effec 
            
autocracy-democracy_<p25 -0.016     
 (0.014)     
autocracy-democracy_>p75 0.038**     
 (0.017)     
trust_politicians  0.006    
  (0.065)    
corruption   -0.176***   
   (0.040)   
pressfree    -0.069  
    (0.055)  
gov_effectiveness     0.380*** 
     (0.048) 
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mobile_cellular/100 0.010 -0.014 0.037* -0.025 0.029 
 (0.022) (0.029) (0.019) (0.027) (0.019) 
HDI 1.002*** 0.766 0.788*** 0.363 0.561*** 
 (0.062) (0.551) (0.065) (0.426) (0.067) 
pop (billions)  0.232*** 0.701 0.285*** 0.839 0.256*** 
 (0.032) (0.558) (0.038) (0.522) (0.037) 
year: 2010 -0.013 -0.006 -0.018 0.001 -0.014 
 (0.019) (0.017) (0.018) (0.014) (0.018) 
year: 2012 0.009 0.032 0.004 0.030* 0.010 
 (0.022) (0.020) (0.021) (0.017) (0.020) 
year: 2014 0.179*** 0.213*** 0.168*** 0.206*** 0.176*** 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) 
year: 2016 0.240*** 0.283*** 0.228*** 0.283*** 0.240*** 
 (0.023) (0.028) (0.021) (0.023) (0.020) 
year: 2018 0.332*** 0.384*** 0.325*** 0.381*** 0.339*** 
 (0.024) (0.031) (0.022) (0.026) (0.021) 
      
Observations 948 830 1,095 986 1,095 
# of countries 160 148 184 170 184 
Hausman statistic 9.29 19.55 9.60 29.81 7.83 
Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No 
Pseudo R2 0.202 0.253 0.189 0.268 0.194 
Log-likelihood -499.2 -419.5 -575.6 -476.3 -572 
AIC 1020 1153 1171 1311 1164 
SIC 1074 1894 1221 2187 1214 
Notes: All models were estimated with a constant. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 2008 is 
the base category of the set of year dummy variables. Statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Regarding the hypothesis related with the political institutional variables, the panel results are 
consistent with H1a, H1c and H1e, but not with H1b and H1d. From column (1), it is possible to 
observe that it is estimated that countries on the top of the distribution of the autocracy-democracy 
index are, on average, associated with an increase of approximately 0.04 points in the EPI. In 
turn, a one-point decrease in the corruption index is estimated to be associated with an increase 
of approximately 0.18 points in the EPI. Lastly, one additional point in the government 
effectiveness index is estimated to be associated with an increase of 0.38 points in the e-
participation score. 
Unlike in the cross-sectional regressions, where no support was found for H2, column (3) of Table 
7 reports some anecdotal evidence of a possible impact of the technology penetration in the EPI. 
Regarding socioeconomic development (H3), positive and significant results are found in 
columns (1), (3) and (5), but not in columns (2) and (4), the model where fixed effects are used. 
A similar landscape is found for population, with no significant results in the models that use 
fixed effects, but positive and significant results in the remaining models. In both cases, it is not 
the magnitude of the coefficient that drops dramatically when fixed effects are included; it is the 
standard error that increases. Recalling the descriptive statistics of Table 1, it is likely that such 
occurrence is explained by the low within variation that both HDI and pop exhibit along the 
sample period. Finally, the results for the year dummy variables point to a global increase in the 
EPI levels in the most recent years of the sample. From 2014 onwards, all the coefficients 
associated with these variables display positive and significant coefficients, following the pattern 





Interactions between institutions and technology penetration 
 
In this subsection, we report the results of the models that were estimated to test H4, the interactive 
hypothesis that posits that the impact that political institutional factors exert on the e-participation 
levels may vary according to the sophistication of the technology penetration.  
Table 8 presents the fractional probit regression coefficients for six different models that follow 
the previously presented equation (3). Columns (1) and (2) are related to the interactions between 
the autocracy-democracy dummies and the mobile cellular penetration. The remaining columns 
present, in this order, the results for the interactions between mobile_cellular and public trust in 
politicians, corruption levels, freedom of the press and government effectiveness. For reasons of 
parsimony, only the results for the variables involved in the interaction terms are presented.4 
 
Table 8. Fractional probit regressions coefficients including interaction terms – dependent 
variable: EPI 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables democracy democracy trust corruption 
press 
freedom gov_effec 
              
autocracy-
democracy_<p25 -0.220** -0.052     
 (0.099) (0.049)     
autocracy-
democracy_<p25* 
wdi_mobile/100 0.203**      
 (0.101)      
autocracy-
democracy_>p75 0.141** 0.230     
 (0.058) (0.158)     
autocracy-
democracy_>p75* 
wdi_mobile/100  -0.093     
  (0.129)     
trust_politicians   -0.103    
   (0.312)    
trust_politicians* 
wdi_mobile/100   0.158    
   (0.276)    
corruption    0.031   
    (0.308)   
corruption* 
wdi_mobile/100    -0.604**   
    (0.271)   
pressfree     0.043  
     (0.332)  
pressfree* 
wdi_mobile/100     -0.357  
     (0.333)  
 
4 The results for the remaining variables of the six models will be provided by the authors upon 
request. 
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gov_effectiveness      0.797** 
      (0.315) 
gov_effectiveness
* wdi_mobile/100      0.471* 
      (0.268) 
wdi_mobile/100 -0.046 0.045 -0.119 0.445*** 0.159 -0.119 
 (0.080) (0.078) (0.155) (0.159) (0.273) (0.135) 
       
Observations 948 948 830 1,095 986 1,095 
# of countries 160 160 148 184 170 184 
Fixed effects No No Yes No Yes No 
Pseudo R2 0.203 0.202 0.253 0.190 0.268 0.195 
Log-likelihood -498.9 -499.2 -419.5 -575.2 -476.3 -571.8 
AIC 1022 1022 1155 1172 1313 1166 
SIC 1080 1081 1901 1227 2193 1221 
Notes: All models were estimated with a constant. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Year 
dummies included: 2008 is the base category of the set of year dummy variables. HDI and pop as 
additional independent variables. Statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
The results presented in Table 8 reveal that the interactions between the democracy and the 
technology penetration-related variables are statistically significant. The same happens for the 
interactions between the latter and the corruption index, as well as the government effectiveness 
index. Therefore, the evidence suggests that the impact that democratic institutions, corruption 
levels and government effectiveness exert in the e-participation levels varies according to the 
technology penetration in each country. 
To get additional information about how technology penetration mediates the relationship 
between the institutional variables and e-participation, the average marginal effects of the 
institutional variables on the EPI along the mobile_cellular distribution were plotted. Figure 3 
presents the plots for the four interactions terms where some regions of statistical significance 
were found.5 The black line inside the blue area represents the estimated average marginal, effects. 
The blue area represents the 95% confidence interval. The red vertical line stands for the mean 
value of mobile_cellular over the entire sample period.  
Figure 3. Average Marginal Effects of the institutional variables with 95% confidence intervals. 
Effects on the conditional mean of EPI in the vertical axis. Values of mobile_cellular in the 
horizontal axis. Mean value of mobile_cellular in the red vertical line. 
 
5 For reasons of parsimony, the remaining two plots are not presented. They will be provided by 




The upper left plot presents the average marginal effects of the variable autocracy-
democracy_<p25 along the mobile_cellular distribution. It reveals that harsh autocracies result in 
poorer EPI scores, but only when technology penetration is low. On the contrary, the upper right 
plot reveals that the positive effect that solid democracies may have on the EPI is only valid for 
values around the mean of mobile_celullar. Both plots point to the idea that the democratic degree 
of the institutions is neutral in contexts of higher technology penetration. In the lower left plot, it 
is possible to observe that the negative effect on EPI associated with high levels of corruption is 
stronger when technology penetration is higher. At last, the lower right plot indicates that, 
although always positive and significant, the average marginal effect of gov_effectiveness on e-
participation is higher when technology penetration is higher. 
 
Interactions between institutions and socioeconomic development 
 
H5 postulates that the impact that political institutional factors exert on e-participation may vary 
according to the socio-economic development of each country. Following equation (4), Table 9 
presents the results for six models that consider interaction terms between the institutional 
variables and the human development index. The first two columns report the interactions 
between the autocracy-democracy dummies and HDI. Columns (3) to (6) present, in this order, 
the results for the interactions between the human development index and public trust in 
politicians, corruption levels, freedom of the press and government effectiveness. As in the table 
of the previous subsection, for reasons of parsimony, only the results for the variables involved 






Table 9. Fractional probit regressions coefficients including interaction terms – dependent 
variable: EPI 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables democracy democracy trust corruption 
press 
freedom gov_effec 
              
autocracy-
democracy_<p25 0.288 -0.049     




 (0.351)      
autocracy-
democracy_>p75 0.104* -1.063**     
 (0.061) (0.492)     
autocracy-
democracy_>p75* 
HDI  1.417**     
  (0.586)     
trust_politicians   -0.999    
   (0.912)    
trust_politicians* 
HDI   1.465    
   (1.293)    
corruption    1.945***   
(0.614) 
corruption* HDI    -3.122***   
    (0.726)   
pressfree     2.893***  
     (0.926)  
pressfree* HDI     -4.582***  
     (1.336)  
gov_effectiveness      -0.349 
      (0.608) 
gov_effectiveness
* HDI      1.961*** 
      (0.703) 
HDI 3.463*** 3.211*** 2.198 4.386*** 4.536*** 1.104*** 
 (0.234) (0.227) (1.989) (0.497) (1.716) (0.339) 
       
Observations 948 948 830 1,095 986 1,095 
# of countries 160 160 148 184 170 184 
Fixed effects No No Yes No Yes No 
Pseudo R2 0.203 0.203 0.253 0.192 0.268 0.195 
Log-likelihood -499 -498.7 -419.4 -574 -475.9 -571.4 
AIC 1022 1021 1155 1170 1312 1165 
SIC 1080 1080 1901 1225 2193 1220 
Notes: All models were estimated with a constant. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Year 
dummies included: 2008 is the base category of the set of year dummy variables. Mobile_cellular 




From Table 9, it is possible to observe that the results support H5. In particular, the interactions 
between the HDI and the high democracy score dummy, as well as with the corruption index, the 
freedom of the press, and government effectiveness are statistically significant.  
As in the previous section, the following Figure presents the plots for the terms where regions of 
statistically significant average marginal effects of the institutional variable on the EPI along the 
distribution of the HDI were found. Once again, the black line inside the blue area represents the 
estimated average marginal effects, while the blue area represents the 95% confidence interval. 
The red vertical line stands for the mean value of HDI over the entire sample period.  
 
Figure 4. Average Marginal Effects of the institutional variables with 95% confidence intervals. 
Effects on the conditional mean of EPI in the vertical axis. Values of HDI in the horizontal axis. 
Mean value of HDI in the red vertical line. 
 
 
The upper left plot presents the average marginal effects of the variable autocracy-
democracy_>p75. It reveals that the positive effect that is found for solid democracies on the EPI 
only holds for contexts in which the socioeconomic development is high. The upper right plot 
stands for the average marginal effects of corruption. Regarding the corrosive effect that 
corruption may have on the EPI only occurs when socioeconomic development is above the mean. 
In fact, there is even anecdotal evidence of the contrary for very low values of the HDI. Despite 
no significant relationship being found between freedom of the press and e-participation in the 
previous sections, the lower left graph provides anecdotal evidence that freedom of the press may 
exert a positive effect in contexts where socioeconomic development is low, and work the other 
way around when socioeconomic development is high. Finally, as in the technology penetration 
case, the lower right plot suggests that governmental effectiveness exerts a higher positive impact 






The overall picture emerging from the findings confirms and extends prior studies on the 
determinants of e-participation. Among the variables assessing the quality of political institutions, 
government effectiveness is the strongest predictor of higher EPI levels, thus confirming the idea 
expressed in Gulati et al. (2014) that higher professionalization of public administration supports 
the adoption and implementation of e-participation tools. The other variables addressing different 
aspects of the quality of political institutions are less consistent over time and only appear as 
relevant predictors in the panel model. Nevertheless, they confirm the hypothesized relationships: 
higher EPI levels appear in countries characterized by better democratic performance, freedom of 
the press, and lower corruption levels. Overall, the findings indicate that the quality of political 
institutions is a crucial contextual element to nurture e-participation initiatives.  
Another important finding of the analyses included in this chapter is the rejection of technological 
determinism when it comes to e-participation (Susha & Grönlund, 2012). Better technological 
penetration, as measured by mobile cellular phone subscriptions per 100 citizens in a country, 
does not appear to be associated with higher e-participation levels. If anything, there is a quality 
threshold beyond which technology penetration is unrelated to e-participation. More importantly, 
the results show that technology penetration mediates the relationship between several indicators 
of the quality of political institutions. First, higher mobile penetration reinforces the positive 
association between government effectiveness and e-participation levels, which is consistent with 
the idea that technological access is important in taking advantage of effective public sectors 
promoting electronic participation tools. Second, the finding that more corrupt countries also 
display lower levels of e-participation is not surprising in itself. However, the idea that better 
technological penetration has a dampening effect on this relationship is discouraging, since it 
suggests that technology may actually contribute to deepen the already negative effects of 
corruption. Finally, as with prior empirical work, the evidence presented here regarding the 
interactions of democratic performance, technology penetration and EPI levels is unclear. The 
worst autocracies with low mobile penetration display the lowest EPI levels, but beyond that the 
evidence becomes mixed. The empirical analysis does not provide incontrovertible support to the 
argument advanced by Stier (2015) for e-government performance that autocracies with better 
technology penetration perform better in the EPI, but it does suggest that this scenario is more 
likely than the opposite one. In other words, technology penetration levels are likely relevant for 
the relationship between a country’s placement in the autocracy-democracy continuum and its 
EPI level.  
These findings contrast with the result for the socio-economic development variable. The HDI is 
an important predictor in every single-year specification and in all but two of the panel models. 
More importantly, the interactive terms support the theoretical argument that e-participation is 
most successful in countries which have high quality political institutions and higher socio-
economic development simultaneously. While this is not exactly a surprising result, the fact that 
the effect is true for four out of five measures of quality of political institutions is quite 
remarkable. Socio-economic development also reinforces the expected positive effects of higher 
democratic performance, lower corruption levels and better government effectiveness on EPI 




This chapter employed data from the E-Participation Index (EPI) developed by the United Nations 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) to analyze the role of the quality of 
political institutions in promoting e-participation over the period of 2008-2018. The findings 
indicate that countries with better democratic performance, lower corruption levels and higher 
government effectiveness are associated with higher EPI scores. While these results are not 
entirely robust to all model specifications and all years under analysis, they are largely supportive 
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of the argument that better political institutions contribute to promote more electronic 
participation at the country level.  
The results also support the main argument included in the theoretical model that this positive 
effect of the quality of political institutions is mediated by more contextual factors, such as 
technology penetration and socio-economic development. Concretely, socio-economic 
development reinforces this positive effect of the quality of institutions, which reaches the 
strongest impact in countries with higher HDI scores. The mediating effect of technology 
penetration, while present, it is far less evident and more mixed. Technology penetration enhances 
the positive impact of government effectiveness and the absence of corruption on e-participation, 
but no clearly discernible trend is present in its interaction with the remaining indicators of the 
quality of political institutions. 
Given the set of findings reported in this chapter, national governments aiming to promote the 
2030 UN Agenda for Sustainable Development Goals (SDG’s) will have to consider additional 
efforts into the adoption of e-participation tools capable of enhancing the availability of 
information, involving citizens in broad consultation processes and promoting deliberative 
decision-making. The successful implementation of these initiatives and the outcomes they are 
likely to generate will be crucial, not only for the legitimacy goals of elected officials but also to 
accomplish the ambitious sustainable development goals. Congruent and concerted national 
agendas for e-participation, while a core concept for e-democracy, shall be considered. The 
ultimate objective will thus be to contribute for the achievement of goals proclaimed in SDG 16, 
namely helping in the reduction of corruption, enhancement of transparency and accountability 
of institutions, promotion of inclusive and participatory processes and policies, and strengthening 




The analyses included in this chapter may suffer from a number of limitations, primarily related 
to the nature of the dependent variable: the E-Participation Index. First, the EPI is questioned on 
the grounds of validity issues discussed at length in Lidén (2015). However, Lidén’s piece 
assumes the EPI is a measure of e-Democracy and that e-Democracy and e-Participation can be 
conflated. Given the content of the EPI, this is not an accurate assumption. The second problem 
relates to the concept of e-participation itself. The EPI does not include outcomes, so the scores 
may be the result of a search for legitimacy on the part of elected officials rather than a genuine 
goal of improving e-participation, particularly in authoritarian regimes. Lastly, the analysis is 
focused on the EPI as a whole, not considering its different dimensions, namely the three main 
components of the index. This may also be a direction for future research despite of it being 
contingent on and constrained by the availability of more detailed data. 
Another set of limitations relates to the independent variables, particularly those aimed at 
measuring the quality of political institutions. There is a high persistency on the values of the 
institutional variables within countries. Institutions typically change slowly and a sample period 
of ten years, while longer than what most (or all) the previous studies have considered, it is still 
limited to measure institutional change. A higher variability and a longer sample period would 
benefit the robustness of the statistical inference and make it more accurate in providing a causal 
interpretation of the results. Additionally, the range of variables to be considered when 
conceptualizing the quality of political institutions might be seen as a limitation. They are 
representative measures to assess the quality of political institutions but are neither exhaustive 





Directions for Future Research 
 
The richness of the panel data included in this chapter should allow the expansion of this 
comparative analysis to consider different dimensions of e-participation and/or the regional 
variation of the EPI country scores. Pending data availability, future research can also investigate 
the adoption (or the “demand side”) of e-participation tools.  
This study identifies broad trends in e-participation across the globe based on single country 
scores. However, as discussed above, the EPI is not without its limitations, so these tendencies 
need to be explored with more in-depth analyses through regional comparisons and country case 
studies. Without these more fine-grained efforts, it is likely that the picture of the country trends 
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